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Gene Park and Steven Vogel
Abstract
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro stepped down in September 2006 after a
five-year term in which he reshaped Japanese politics by undermining his own
party’s political machine, stretched the constraints on Japan’s military role,
and promoted a program of “structural” economic reform. In his final year in
office, he confronted a backlash against his economic reform program and
presided over a chill in relations with China and South Korea. Abe Shinzo
replaced Koizumi, pledging to repair relations with Japan’s neighbors and to
promote a pro-growth economic strategy.
Keywords: Japan, politics, foreign policy, economy
Koizumi Junichiro, the longest-ruling prime minister since
Sato Eisaku (1964–72), spent his last year in office basking in the glory of elec-
toral victory, economic recovery, and strong U.S.-Japan ties. Yet, he also en-
countered signs of a backlash against his economic reform program, including
public concern about growing economic inequalities, and he presided over a deep
chill in Japan’s relations with China. When Koizumi stepped down in Septem-
ber 2006, he left his successor, Abe Shinzo, with a very tough act to follow. Koi-
zumi not only enjoyed personal charisma and media savvy that Abe could not
replicate but Koizumi also could claim credit for a strong and sustained eco-
nomic recovery and an unprecedented Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) victory
in the September 2005 lower house elections.
Meanwhile, Abe would have to confront some unpleasant fallout from the Koi-
zumi era, including an enormous government debt, the highest among Organiza-
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tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries at 170%
of gross domestic product (GDP), plus the implementation of some of Koizumi’s
“structural” reforms, including the privatization of the postal system. Abe would
also have to try to repair relations with China and South Korea. Koizumi had
exacerbated tensions with Japan’s neighbors by repeatedly visiting the Yasu-
kuni Shrine, which houses 14 Class A war criminals plus a museum with an
alarmingly revisionist interpretation of Japan’s wartime history, and he did not
miss the opportunity for one final visit on August 15, 2006.
The Koizumi Legacy
Koizumi had come to power in 2001 under the banner of economic reform—
and yet he left a greater personal legacy in domestic politics and foreign policy.
Some of Koizumi’s structural reforms, such as special public corporation reform
and decentralization, were already under way before he assumed office. His
administration continued, rather than initiated, a broad array of more-technical
reforms that have given Japanese businesses new options for restructuring. These
ranged from labor market reform to accounting and corporate governance
reform. Moreover, Koizumi’s economic reform priorities were misplaced. He
expended enormous political capital on reforms that were unlikely to produce
short-term benefits, such as postal and special public corporation reform, while
stalling on the issues most salient to recovery: combating deflation and resolv-
ing the banking crisis. To Koizumi’s credit, his administration finally addressed
the latter issues under the combined leadership of economic policy czar Take-
naka Heizo and Bank of Japan Governor Fukui Toshihiko. Koizumi was slow to
pursue this agenda, however, and he hesitated to back Takenaka in early skir-
mishes with the LDP old guard.
On the domestic political front, meanwhile, Koizumi brilliantly executed a
strategy of saving the LDP by attacking it. That is, he understood that many
Japanese voters, especially those in urban and suburban areas, were fed up with
the LDP’s old-style political machine, which relied heavily on pork-barrel spend-
ing and resource transfers from urban to rural areas. Koizumi undercut this
system directly by reducing public works spending and indirectly by reform-
ing the postal finance system and the special public corporations that channeled
much of the funding for this spending. Koizumi culminated this strategy with
the 2005 election, when he banished those LDP members in the lower house
who had voted against his postal privatization bill from the party and recruited
“assassin” candidates to run against them. The party won an astounding 296
seats, up from 212, and emerged with a more even distribution of Diet mem-
bers from urban and rural districts and a large new cohort of “Koizumi kids”
who owed their election to Koizumi.
In saving the LDP, however, the prime minister may have undermined the
foundation of the party’s long-term rule. Koizumi accelerated a trend away
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from a party electoral strategy centered on mobilizing clientelistic networks
toward greater emphasis on leaders, image, and policies. In its heyday, the
LDP had enjoyed strong rural support via a broad social coalition that spanned
from farmers to small business owners, as well as through stable clientelistic
networks that enabled the party to win elections even with weak leaders, im-
age problems, or flawed policies. The LDP finished 2006 with unprecedented
strength in the lower house, yet it was vulnerable in the sense that Koizumi
had undermined some traditional sources of party strength and withdrawn its
more recent trump card—himself.
Koizumi had come to office with very little foreign policy experience, yet
he was surprisingly bold in this realm. Japan under Koizumi responded deci-
sively to support U.S.-led military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. In doing
so, the government passed legislation that substantially stretched the limits
of Article 9 of the Constitution, thereby redefining the role of Japan’s mili-
tary forces. Koizumi also pushed forward the process of considering constitu-
tional revision.
Koizumi’s Final Year: The Backlash
Having secured the LDP’s electoral victory and passed the postal privatization
bill, Koizumi had few major ambitions for his final year. He pledged to step
down at the end of his term as party president in September, leaving Abe and a
few rivals to jockey for the top spot. As the glow of electoral victory faded,
however, critics of Koizumi’s reform program became more vocal. In the fall
of 2005, the Asahi Shimbun ran a series of articles on economic inequality, and
other newspapers and television soon embraced the issue. Analysts noted marked
increases in disparities across income groups and geographical regions and
some blamed the Koizumi reform agenda for these increases. Meanwhile, the
number of households below the minimum income threshold had jumped from
780,000 in 2001 to 1,040,000 in 2005.1 Polls revealed that a declining percent-
age of respondents identified themselves as middle class and an increasing num-
ber as lower middle class or poor.2 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader
Maehara Seiji raised the issue in the Diet in January 2006, noting that the Gini
coefficient, a measure of income inequality, had risen during Koizumi’s term
of office. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 81% of Japanese believed that in-
come and other disparities were increasing; of these, 56% believed that Koi-
zumi’s structural reforms were to blame.3 In fact, rising income inequalities
were driven more by the prolonged economic stagnation and demographic
shifts than specific government policies. The inequalities were greatest among
1. Oriental Economist (May 2006), p. 7.
2. Nikkei Weekly, February 20, 2006.
3. Asia Policy Weekly, March 12–18, 2006.
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the elderly because the population is aging, and Japan’s pension system is rel-
atively weak. The young also suffered from the decline in employment oppor-
tunities for entry-level workers during more than a decade of stagnation.
Meanwhile, two entrepreneurs who had symbolized a new ruthless brand of
capitalism, Horie Takafumi and Murakami Yoshiaki, fell from grace in rather
spectacular fashion during the year. Some commentators even charged that mem-
bers of the establishment had fabricated scandals to exact revenge upon these
upstarts. The episodes certainly marked a shift in the tide against those who chal-
lenged Japanese business norms. In January Horie was arrested on suspicion
of violating the Securities and Exchange Law by spreading false information.
A college dropout, Horie had embodied the image of the maverick entrepreneur.
He brazenly bucked tradition as he built up his Internet firm, Livedoor. Then he
challenged the media establishment directly with a highly publicized attempt
to take over the privately owned Nippon Broadcasting System. The LDP sup-
ported Horie as an assassin candidate in the 2005 election, although he offi-
cially ran as an independent. Takenaka, Koizumi’s economic reform adviser, even
campaigned for Horie. Although the entrepreneur lost to former LDP heavy-
weight Kamei Shizuka, the Koizumi administration’s association with Horie
backfired in the wake of the scandal.
Then in June, Murakami was arrested for insider trading. Murakami, a former
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) official, even more than Horie,
represented a new style of capitalism that could transform Japan. Murakami
was an unabashed advocate for shareholder rights who had launched the first
hostile takeover by a Japanese company. He challenged a business system
characterized by passive shareholders and stable crossholding arrangements.
He drew admiration from some, and reservations from many. Even Fukui, the
Bank of Japan governor, was implicated in the scandal indirectly as an early
investor in the Murakami Fund.
For many, Horie’s and Murakami’s downfall served as a cautionary tale of
the excesses of unbridled capitalism. The two businessmen had offices headquar-
tered in the same Roppongi Hills complex, a posh development that symbolized
the new entrepreneurial spirit. Otsuru Motonari, one of the Tokyo prosecutors
investigating the pair, articulated the public unease with Japan’s market re-
forms: “We cannot let this become a society where people who sweat from their
labor, or who want to work but can’t because of restructuring, can be taken ad-
vantage of.”4
Despite Koizumi’s success in the 2005 elections, he stumbled in his attempt
to revise the Imperial Household Law to allow for a female heir to the throne.
Because the two sons of Empero Akihito, Crown Prince Naruhito and Prince
Akishino, had not produced a male heir to the throne, Koizumi appointed a
4. Economist, London, June 17, 2006, p. 47.
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commission to study possibilities for ensuring the imperial line. In late 2005,
the commission recommended revising the law to allow for female succes-
sion. Koizumi backed the proposal but soon encountered a backlash from
members of his own party, including Foreign Minister Aso Taro and Finance
Minister Tanigaki Sadakazu. To make matters worse, even some of the first-
term Diet members who had ridden to power on Koizumi’s coattails in the
lower house elections opposed the proposal. Then the reform was put on hold
with the unexpected news that Princess Kiko, wife of Prince Akishino, was
pregnant. Koizumi bowed to pressure from within the party, even though polls
showed a majority of the public supported the possibility of female succes-
sion. On September 6, 2006, Princess Kiko gave birth to a male heir, Prince
Hisahito, effectively putting the issue to rest.
Koizumi’s cabinet approval ratings dropped sharply in the new year, from
59% in December 2005 to 45% in February 2006.5 Yet, the opposition DPJ
was not well positioned to take advantage of the slump. In the wake of the
party’s stunning electoral defeat in 2005, the DPJ had regrouped under the lead-
ership of a young and telegenic rising star, Maehara Seiji. Maehara resigned
after only six months, however, as the DPJ became embroiled in a fiasco in
which a party member falsely accused the LDP secretary-general of having
financial ties to Horie’s Livedoor. Ozawa Ichiro, a former LDP power broker
and the central architect of the party’s breakup in 1993, then emerged as the
unlikely leader of the DPJ in April 2006. Ozawa had advocated political re-
form, economic liberalization, and a more assertive foreign policy in his book,
Blueprint for a New Japan, which was first published in Japanese in 1993. This
reform agenda fit awkwardly with the DPJ’s policy profile, yet Ozawa was
willing to moderate his policy stance as the new party leader. More critically,
perhaps, he sought to apply his political skills to strengthen the party’s voter
mobilization efforts in specific election contests. In the short run, Ozawa was
bolstered by a DPJ victory in a lower house by-election in Chiba in April
2006. In the longer run, the DPJ has been unable to dispel the perception that
it was not yet ready to govern, although it remained hopeful for a strong show-
ing in the 2007 upper house elections.
The Economy
The Japanese economy passed a symbolic milestone in November 2006 when
it surpassed the postwar record of 57 straight months of economic growth, beat-
ing out the “Izanagi boom” of 1965–70. The economy experienced moderate
inflation during the year, continuing a trend that had started at the end of 2005.
The Bank of Japan suspended quantitative targets and returned to a more ortho-
dox interest rate policy in March 2006. As the economy gained momentum,
5. Nihon Keizai Shimbun polls, cited in Japan Economic Newswire, February 5, 2006.
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the central bank raised interest rates in July. Ironically, however, the economic
recovery generated new policy cleavages within the ruling party. Takenaka,
who had been shifted to minister of Internal Affairs and Communications in
October 2005, favored keeping interest rates low and putting the top priority
on growth. Low interest rates would reduce debt-servicing costs, and higher
growth would bring in more tax revenue. Takenaka and Nakagawa Hidenao,
chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council, argued that this would be the
best route to fiscal reconstruction and downplayed the need for large tax in-
creases. Of course, such a policy line would require cooperation with the Bank
of Japan, which is inclined to assert its independence. Finance Minister Tani-
gaki and Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Yosano Kaoru put a
higher priority on budgetary balance and favored the early introduction of tax
increases.
This debate played out in the process of drafting the fiscal reform plan an-
nounced in July 2006. The government would cut spending by between ¥ 11.4
trillion ($98.2 billion) and ¥ 14.3 trillion ($120.4 billion) over five years to cover
roughly 70% of the projected revenue shortfall, and aim to restore primary bal-
ance to the budget (revenue minus expenditures excluding debt servicing) by
2011.6 Having backtracked on his previous pledges to reduce debt issuance,
Koizumi finally did so in his final year in office. But he avoided committing
himself to tax increases. The prime minister had promised not to raise the con-
sumption tax under his administration; in the early part of his term, the weak-
ness of the economy gave him sound justification for this. With the recovery in
full swing, however, the issue of tax increases inevitably reemerged. Because
the fiscal reform plan would not cover the entire projected revenue shortfall,
the government will probably have to raise the consumption tax from 5% to
6%–7% in order to meet its own targets for budgetary balance.
The Koizumi administration addressed a final piece of his structural reform
package with an administrative reform bill passed in May 2006. The bill called
for a 5% reduction of government employees by the end of fiscal 2010. It also
reorganized nine government financial institutions. Four would be merged into
one, two would be privatized, and one would be abolished. Overseas develop-
ment assistance (ODA) would also be restructured, with the ODA operations
of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation being consolidated under an
existing public financial entity, the Japan International Cooperation Agency.
With this move, Koizumi continued a process started in the early 1990s, re-
ducing the number of posts designated for retiring bureaucrats who “descend
from heaven” (amakudari) into lucrative positions in quasi-public or private
corporations.
6. Nikkei Weekly, July 3, 2006, p. 6.
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Foreign Relations
During 2006 Koizumi continued to solidify ties with the United States. In May
the two governments agreed to realign U.S. military bases throughout Japan
and transfer 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The two sides failed
to agree on cost-sharing arrangements and other contentious points by the tar-
get deadline in March, but they bridged the key differences soon thereafter.
Japan would cover most of the cost of relocating the troops. The Japanese
government moved ahead with the military base realignment agreement de-
spite strong opposition from the local governments that would be affected. In
Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture, 89% of local residents voted in a plebiscite
in March to reject a plan to relocate American aircraft and military personnel
to their area.
The Koizumi administration unequivocally asserted the primacy of the U.S.-
Japan military alliance, insisting that the vote would not affect the realignment.
Washington and Tokyo also moved forward with joint development of a mis-
sile defense program, deploying military radar in Aomori Prefecture as part of
an early warning system against incoming missiles. They successfully tested a
Japanese developed nosecone for missiles armed with a warhead for destroying
ballistic missiles. Koizumi finally withdrew 600 ground troops providing hu-
manitarian assistance in the Samawah region of Iraq in July 2006, bringing to
a close one of his boldest foreign policy moves. The prime minister completed
his tenure in office with a feel-good farewell tour in the United States during
which he toured Graceland, the estate of his personal idol, Elvis Presley.
The Koizumi administration played a leading role in responding to North
Korean missile tests in July. After North Korea test fired seven missiles, in-
cluding an unsuccessful launch of a long-range Taepodong 2, Japan announced
sanctions and criticized the Pyongyang regime for violating a moratorium on
missile tests. North Korea had negotiated the moratorium with the United States
in 1999 and reaffirmed it with Japan after Koizumi’s historic visit to North
Korea in 2002. Japan moved quickly to sponsor a U.N. Security Council reso-
lution with support from the United States, Britain, and France to censure the
North Korean regime. The Chinese and Russians blocked the sanctions pro-
posed in the draft, but Japan and its allies were still successful in closing ranks
and passing a clear resolution. The hardline rhetoric of Japanese leaders, in-
cluding calls for retaliatory strikes against North Korea, drew a backlash in
South Korea with President Roh Moo Hyun himself criticizing Japan for this
provocation.
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine contributed to a growing deteriora-
tion in relations with both China and South Korea. Koizumi kept his campaign
promise by visiting the shrine as prime minister for one last time on August
15, the anniversary of the end of World War Two. Beijing and Seoul protested,
but the reaction lacked some of the rancor of earlier outbursts because leaders
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of both countries had already resigned themselves to waiting for Koizumi’s
replacement before trying to improve ties with Japan.
The Succession Race
For much of 2006, the domestic political scene revolved around the race to
succeed Koizumi as party president and prime minister. On the heels of the
lower house electoral landslide, Koizumi was positioned well to influence the se-
lection of his successor. The prime minister made it clear that he preferred a
candidate who would be willing to continue his economic and administrative
reforms. While not explicitly endorsing Abe, a popular younger-generation Diet
leader, Koizumi offered his tacit support. Abe had made his name by taking a
hard-line stance against North Korea over the issue of kidnapped Japanese na-
tionals. Despite his distinguished political pedigree as the grandson of postwar
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and son of former Foreign Minister Abe Shin-
taro, he did not serve in the cabinet until Koizumi appointed him as chief cab-
inet secretary in October 2005. Abe quickly jumped out as the front-runner in
the race for prime minister.
The public debate among the contenders for the LDP presidency revolved
around the issues Koizumi had left unresolved, especially fiscal reform and
Sino-Japanese relations. Precisely because Koizumi had vowed not to raise the
consumption tax, this question fell to his would-be successors. Given the mag-
nitude of Japan’s fiscal deficit, it would be irresponsible not to consider tax in-
creases, yet raising the consumption tax would be highly unpopular. Finance
Minister Tanigaki, one of the contenders, argued that raising the consumption
tax would be essential for fiscal reconstruction and proposed a hike from 5%
to 10%. Tanigaki also criticized Koizumi’s fiscal reforms for not doing enough
to restore fiscal balance. Foreign Minister Aso and former Chief Cabinet Sec-
retary Fukuda Yasuo took more moderate positions. Abe adhered most closely
to Koizumi’s course, focusing on increasing revenues through growth and
decreasing expenditures by reducing the size of the budget.
As relations with Japan’s neighbors deteriorated, a backlash ensued. The
Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), which was concerned that the politi-
cal fallout might undermine Japan’s business relations with China, called for the
prime minister to cease visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Tanigaki criticized Koi-
zumi’s visits; Fukuda called for the erection of a separate national war memo-
rial to honor the war dead; and Aso backed a proposal to defuse the problem
by nationalizing the shrine. Koizumi’s visits were supported by Abe as chief
cabinet secretary, a position that was natural for the latter given his more con-
servative view of history and his hard line on China and South Korea. Then in
April, Abe himself made another pilgrimage to Yasukuni. However, he refused
to say whether he would visit the shrine as prime minister. The Yasukuni issue
took another turn in July when it was revealed that Emperor Hirohito, the
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Showa Emperor, had refrained from visiting the shrine because of the Class-A
war criminals buried there. This provided potential face-saving cover for Abe,
who could choose not to visit the shrine by invoking the position of the former
emperor.
In the months before the vote on the LDP presidency, Abe maintained an
overwhelming lead in public opinion polls and within the LDP. Fukuda, the only
credible rival, decided not to run, leaving only Aso and Tanigaki in the race.
Abe captured 66% of the ballots, a higher share than Koizumi’s in 2001. Abe’s
election reflected yet another Koizumi legacy, a shift in the way in which prime
ministers are selected. Like Koizumi in 2001, Abe prevailed in 2006 because
of popularity and strong support from local party chapters rather than a favor-
able factional balance and behind-the-scenes maneuvering.
The Abe Opportunity
Not surprisingly, Abe sought to start off his term by taking the initiative in the
one area where he was most likely to improve on the Koizumi record: rela-
tions with China and South Korea. Koizumi had been unwilling to bend on the
issue of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, so he had little prospect for better rela-
tions with Japan’s neighbors. Abe moved even more quickly than observers had
expected, visiting both China and South Korea within two weeks of taking
office. As it turned out, Abe’s advisers had been working secretly behind the
scenes to arrange the visits in advance. They reportedly assured the Chinese
that Abe would not visit Yasukuni Shrine for at least one year.
The North Korean regime then shook the international community once
again by testing a nuclear weapon on October 9. Japan preempted the United
Nations by announcing an expansion of economic sanctions on October 11,
banning all imports, denying port entry to vessels registered as North Korean,
and prohibiting the entry of North Korean citizens into Japan. The Security
Council followed with a resolution condemning the test on October 14, with
even the Chinese and Russians agreeing to impose sanctions on Pyongyang. In
the wake of the nuclear test, Foreign Minister Aso and LDP Policy Research
Council Chair Nakagawa Shoichi even suggested that Japan might consider
developing its own nuclear weapons, but Abe insisted that it would not.
Abe’s cabinet selections suggested that he would emphasize foreign affairs
over economic policy and would favor upgrading Japan’s military role and ca-
pabilities. He reappointed Aso, who had antagonized the Chinese with his
public remarks. He installed Kyuma Fumio, who favored upgrading the De-
fense Agency to ministerial status, as the agency’s new director-general. And
he appointed Koike Yuriko, a former environment minister, to a newly created
post of national security adviser. Abe appointed Nakagawa Hidenao, the archi-
tect of the fiscal reform scheme, as secretary-general of the LDP, suggesting
that Abe would probably follow through with the gist of the plan. Abe pledged,
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however, to postpone tax hikes until after the upper house election in July 2007.
He sought to portray himself as a gentler alternative to Koizumi by addressing
public concern over growing inequality. Before taking office Abe had proposed
a “rechallenge” program to give public sector jobs to part-time workers and to
use public financial institutions to help failed businesses start over. He also
placed high priority on educational reform. And in line with his growth-oriented
economic strategy, he announced an innovation initiative building on programs
devised by METI.
In the final month of 2006, in an act widely viewed as bowing to internal
LDP pressure, Abe brought back into his party the 11 former LDP members
who had rebelled against Koizumi’s postal privatization bill. While this may
have helped his standing with the LDP’s traditional support base, it triggered a
wider public backlash and a sharp decline in his cabinet’s already waning level
of public support.
Abe has extended institutional reforms from the Koizumi era designed to
strengthen the power of the prime minister and the cabinet vis-à-vis the minis-
tries. He formed a new “Team Abe” at the prime minister’s office consisting of
four Diet members plus one former bureaucrat as senior advisers and 10 bu-
reaucrats as core staff. He reshuffled the Council on Economic and Fiscal Pol-
icy (CEFP), which had played a central role in driving Koizumi’s economic
reform program. And Abe announced plans to create a National Security Coun-
cil loosely based on the American model. Abe thus began his term with an in-
stitutional structure that would facilitate top-down leadership from the prime
minister. It remains to be seen if he can match his predecessor in exercising
personal leadership skills to make the most of the new institutional possibilities.
